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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of legalized prostitution on human trafficking inflows. 
According to economic theory, there are two opposing effects of unknown magnitude. The 
scale effect of legalized prostitution leads to an expansion of the prostitution market, 
increasing human trafficking, while the substitution effect reduces demand for trafficked 
women as legal prostitutes are favored over trafficked ones. Our empirical analysis for a 
cross-section of up to 150 countries shows that the scale effect dominates the substitution 
effect. On average, countries where prostitution is legal experience larger reported human 
trafficking inflows. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Much recent scholarly attention has focused on the effect of globalization on human rights 
(Bjørnskov, 2008; de Soysa & Vadlamannati, 2011) and women’s rights in particular (Cho, 
2011; Potrafke & Ursprung, 2012). Yet, one important, and largely neglected, aspect of 
globalization with direct human rights implications is the increased trafficking of human 
beings (Cho and Vadlamannati, 2012; Potrafke, 2011), one of the dark sides of globalization. 
Similarly, globalization scholars with their emphasis on the apparent loss of national 
sovereignty often neglect the impact that domestic policies crafted at the country level can 
still exert on aspects of globalization. This article analyzes how one important domestic 
policy choice – the legal status of prostitution – affects the incidence of human trafficking 
inflows to countries. 
 Most victims of international human trafficking are women and girls. The vast 
majority end up being sexually exploited through prostitution (United Nations Office of 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2006). Many authors therefore believe that trafficking is caused 
by prostitution and combating prostitution with the force of the law would reduce trafficking 
(Outshoorn, 2005). For example, Hughes (2000) maintains that “evidence seems to show that 
legalized sex industries actually result in increased trafficking to meet the demand for women 
to be used in the legal sex industries” (p. 651). Farley (2009) suggests that “wherever 
prostitution is legalized, trafficking to sex industry marketplaces in that region increases” (p. 
313).1 In its Trafficking in Persons report, the U.S. State Department (2007) states as the 
official U.S. Government position “that prostitution is inherently harmful and dehumanizing 
and fuels trafficking in persons” (p. 27). The idea that combating human trafficking requires 
combating prostitution is, in fact, anything but new. As Outshoorn (2005, p. 142) points out, 
the UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons from 1949 had 
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already called on all states to suppress prostitution.2 See Limoncelli (2010) for a 
comprehensive historical overview. 
Others disagree. They argue that the legalization of prostitution will improve working 
and safety conditions for sex workers, allowing sex businesses to recruit among domestic 
women who choose prostitution as their free choice of occupation. This, in turn, makes 
resorting to trafficked women less attractive (Bureau of the Dutch National Rapporteur on 
Trafficking, 2005; Segrave, 2009). While those who call for combating prostitution with the 
force of the law typically subscribe to the belief that prostitution is almost always forced and 
rarely truly voluntary (Farley, 2009), the view that the legalization of prostitution may reduce 
trafficking is typically held by those who believe that the choice to sell one’s sexual services 
for money need not always be forced, but can be a voluntary occupational choice. See 
Limoncelli (2009) who discusses both sides of this debate. 
In this article, we argue that theoretically the legalization of prostitution has two 
contradictory effects on the incidence of trafficking, a substitution effect away from 
trafficking and a scale effect increasing trafficking. Which of these effects dominate in reality, 
and whether legalization is therefore likely to increase or decrease trafficking, is an empirical 
question. The extant qualitative literature contains many strongly held views and beliefs, 
sometimes based on anecdotal evidence, but little in terms of systematic and rigorous 
research. We know of only two quantitative studies which have tried to answer this empirical 
question.3 In their main estimations, Akee, Bedi, Basu and Chau (2010a) find that prostitution 
laws have no effect on whether there is any reported incidence of trafficking between two 
country pairs in a global cross-sectional dyad country sample. They do find a negative effect 
of legalized prostitution on human trafficking in two of their three sets of instrumental 
variable estimations (prostitution law is not the variable instrumented for), but this result is 
due to sample selection effects since the inclusion of settler mortality rates as an instrument 
leads to the loss of almost half of their observations, most likely in a non-random way. 
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Jakobsson and Kotsadam (2011), on the other hand, find a positive effect of legalized 
prostitution on human trafficking in a cross-sectional monadic dataset of 31 European 
countries. 
Our empirical analysis differs from these existing studies. Jakobsson and Kotsadam’s 
(2011) study is similar to ours in that we also analyze human trafficking at the monadic 
country level. However, in contrast to their study, we use a global sample consisting of up to 
150 countries. European countries are only a sub-sample of relevant destination countries for 
human trafficking. Not only are there other developed target countries such as the United 
States, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, but also several non-OECD countries such 
as China, Pakistan, Turkey, Thailand and some Arab countries, all of which are important 
destination countries as well. This begs the question whether Jakobsson and Kotsadam’s 
(2011) finding can be generalized or is confined to Europe.  
Despite our sample being global like Akee et al.’s (2010a) study, we do not attempt to 
estimate the incidence of trafficking at the bilateral (dyadic) country level like they do. 
Dyadic studies only outperform monadic studies such as ours if the data quality at the dyadic 
level is sufficiently high. We contend that this does not hold for human trafficking. As will be 
explained further below, even at the monadic level the quality of data is relatively low. It is 
much worse at the bilateral level. With this in mind, one price that Akee et al. (2010a) pay for 
moving to the dyadic level is the loss of all information on the intensity of trafficking – their 
dependent variable is a dichotomous one, i.e., whether trafficking between a country pair 
exists or not. This loss of information may well represent one reason why Akee et al. (2010a) 
find no effect of prostitution laws on human trafficking in their main estimations. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In section 2, we discuss what 
economic theory can tell us about the effects of legalizing prostitution on the incidence of 
human trafficking. Contrary to Jakobsson and Kotsadam (2011), who suggest an 
unambiguously positive effect, we show that the effect is theoretically indeterminate because 
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the substitution effect and the scale effect work in opposite directions. Therefore, being an 
essentially empirical question, we are keen to construct a global dataset. We exploit a measure 
of the reported intensity of human trafficking flows into the country under observation on a 
scale of 0 to 5. This measure and our research design are described in section 3, while section 
4 presents the results. We find that countries with legalized prostitution have a statistically 
significantly larger reported incidence of human trafficking inflows. This holds true 
regardless of the model we use to estimate the equations and the variables we control for in 
the analysis. Also, the main finding is not dominated by trafficking to a particular region of 
the world.  
 
2. THEORY 
In this section, we discuss what economic theory suggests regarding the effect of the 
legalization of prostitution on trafficking. Akee et al. (2010a) provide an excellent game-
theoretic analysis on the effects of anti-trafficking law enforcement in source and destination 
countries between such country pairs. However, their analysis tells us nothing about the effect 
of the legalization of prostitution in itself. This is because contrary to Akee et al.’s (2010a) 
implicit underlying assumption, the legalization of prostitution is not equal to laxer 
enforcement of anti-trafficking laws and, conversely, the fact that prostitution is illegal does 
not imply stricter anti-trafficking enforcement. Human trafficking always remains illegal even 
if prostitution becomes legal. Moreover, by erroneously equating the legal status of 
prostitution with different levels of law enforcement with respect to human trafficking, Akee 
et al. (2010a) overlook other demand and supply effects that the legalization of prostitution 
may have on human trafficking. Jakobsson and Kotsadam’s (2011) paper is closer to our 
theoretical analysis in this regard as they directly focus on the supply and demand effects of 
legalizing prostitution. However, they only take into account the scale effect, i.e., the 
expansion of prostitution markets after legalization. As we will show below, there is an 
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opposing substitution effect replacing illegal, forced prostitution with voluntary, legal 
prostitution, making the overall effect indeterminate. 
Our discussion is gender-neutral, referring to individuals, persons and prostitutes in 
general, rather than female prostitutes. This is because the theoretical arguments, in principle, 
equally apply to boys and, possibly, men, also trafficked into the sex industry. We are, of 
course, under no illusion that the overwhelming majority of individuals affected by trafficking 
are in fact girls and women. 
A theoretical analysis of the effect of the legality of prostitution on international 
human trafficking is rendered complicated by the fact that, as Edlund and Korn (2002) point 
out, not all prostitution is the same. Street prostitution differs from prostitution in brothels, 
bars and clubs, which also differs from prostitution offered by call girls (and boys) and escort 
agencies. Differences include, but are not limited to, the types of services rendered, numbers 
of clients served, types of clients served, sizes of payments and also the share of illegally 
trafficked prostitutes working in each market segment. For simplicity, we will avoid such 
complications by assuming that there is one single market for prostitution. 
Let us assume a situation in which prostitution is entirely illegal in a country and those 
engaging in prostitution –  i.e., sex workers, their pimps and clients – are prosecuted, if 
caught. As with other illegal markets, e.g., the market for classified drugs or endangered 
species, illegality does not eradicate the market, given that there is strong demand from clients 
on the one hand, and the willingness to supply prostitution services on the other hand.4 The 
equilibrium quantity of prostitution will be a function of supply and demand, just as in any 
other market. A commonly recognized stylized fact is that despite working conditions that 
many would regard as exploitative, wages earned by prostitutes tend to be high relative to 
their human capital endowments such as education and skills,5 and therefore relative to the 
wages they could earn outside prostitution.6 This has been explained by factors such as 
compensation for social stigma7 and exclusion, risky and unattractive working conditions, and 
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forgone marriage benefits (Cameron, 2002; Edlund & Korn, 2002; Giusta, Di Tommaso & 
Strøm, 2009). Another reason, we suggest, is the compensation for allowing random and often 
previously unknown clients to infiltrate private and intimate spheres. Importantly, there will 
be a wage premium, all other things being equal, if prostitution is illegal compared to a 
situation in which prostitution is legal, since sex workers (and their pimps) need to be 
additionally compensated for the risk of prosecution. This is similar to the price premium for 
banned goods like drugs (Miron & Zwiebel, 1991; Miron, 2003). 
What will be the effect of legalizing prostitution on the demand, supply, and thus 
equilibrium quantity of prostitution? Starting with the demand effect, some clients will be 
deterred from consuming commercial sex services if prostitution is illegal and they expect that 
there is a reasonable probability of being prosecuted, as this raises the costs of engaging in 
such activities. Legalizing prostitution will therefore almost invariably increase demand for 
prostitution.8 Concerning supply, legalizing prostitution will induce some potential sex 
workers (or their pimps) to enter the market, namely those who were deterred from offering 
such services by the threat of prosecution and for whom the pay premium that arose from the 
illegality of prostitution represented insufficient compensation – i.e., the risk of prosecution 
creates costs that are not easily expressed in monetary terms and can therefore not be 
compensated for with a higher wage. One might conjecture that supply could also decrease 
given that the state will want to raise taxes from legalized prostitution, whereas illegal 
prostitution, by definition, does not entail payment of taxes. However, this is not the case. 
Those unwilling or unable to operate legally (including meeting the legal obligation to pay 
taxes), can continue to operate illegally. Before, their business was illegal because prostitution 
was illegal; now their business is illegal due to their tax evasion in the shadow economy. 
Supply could only decrease under the assumption that the state prosecutes tax evasion more 
vigorously than it prosecuted illegal prostitution before, which, we believe, will not be the 
case.9 As is the case with demand, supply will therefore increase as well. With demand and 
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supply both increasing, the equilibrium quantity of prostitution will be higher in the legalized 
regime compared to the situation where prostitution is illegal. 
If the scale of prostitution becomes larger once it is rendered legal, will the incidence 
of human trafficking also increase? The increased equilibrium quantity of prostitution will, for 
a constant share of trafficked prostitutes among all prostitutes, exert an increasing scale effect 
on the incidence of international trafficking for prostitution purposes.10 This is the effect 
Jakobsson and Kotsadam (2011) take into account. It is only part of the whole story, however. 
The full answer to the question depends on what happens to the composition of prostitutes and 
whether any substitution effect away from trafficked prostitutes (towards domestic prostitutes 
or foreign prostitutes legally residing and working in the country) is stronger than the scale 
effect. Under conditions of illegality, a certain share of prostitutes will consist of trafficked 
individuals, given the difficulties in recruiting individuals willing to voluntarily work in such 
an illegal market.11 This share of trafficked prostitutes is likely to fall after legalization. Sex 
businesses wishing to take advantage of the legality of prostitution (instead of remaining 
illegal) would want to recruit more national citizens or foreigners legally residing with a work 
permit in the country since employing trafficked foreign prostitutes (or, for that matter, 
illegally residing foreign prostitutes that were not trafficked) endangers their newly achieved 
legal status.12  
However, the legalization of prostitution will not reduce the share of trafficked 
prostitutes to zero. First, there may be insufficient supply among domestic or legally residing 
foreign individuals, given the risky and unattractive nature of prostitution which persists even 
after legalization. Second, trafficked individuals are significantly more vulnerable and 
exposed to the demands of their pimps, which makes their continued employment attractive to 
some extent. For example, a greater portion of their earnings can be extracted, making their 
pimps’ business more lucrative than operating with legal prostitutes. Third, clients might have 
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preferences for “exotic” sex workers from geographically remote places whose nationals are 
unlikely to have legal rights to reside in the country.  
There is consequently a substitution effect away from illegally trafficked prostitutes 
(as well as illegally residing non-trafficked prostitutes) to legally residing prostitutes, but just 
how strong this substitution effect is remains an empirical matter. In sum, the effect of 
legalization of prostitution on the international trafficking of human beings is theoretically 
indeterminate as the two effects, with unknown magnitudes, work in opposite directions. We 
therefore now turn to our empirical analysis to shed light on whether, on average, the 
substitution effect or the scale (quantity) effect dominates. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
(a) Data on human trafficking and prostitution laws 
One of the biggest challenges of doing research on human trafficking is the scarcity of reliable 
and comparable data. Human trafficking is a clandestine, criminal activity, with those being 
trafficked and involved in such activities being part of ‘hidden populations’ (Tyldum & 
Brunovskis, 2005). Therefore, the true number of human trafficking victims is unknown 
(Belser, de Cock & Mehran, 2005). Currently, existing data available across countries – 
although reflecting fragmented information only – can be divided into three categories: 
characteristics of victims, trafficking routes, and country reports (Kangaspunta, 2003). 
Extensive data on victims have been collected by the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) and utilized for micro-analyses on the characteristics of human trafficking (Di 
Tommaso, Shima, Strøm & Bettio, 2009; Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2010). The reports by the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2006, 2009), the US Department of 
State (2001-2011) and the Protection Project (2002) provide information on trafficking routes; 
some of them being utilized in recent gravity analyses on human trafficking (Akee et al., 
2010a, b).  
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 Among the currently available sources, the aforementioned Report on Trafficking in 
Persons: Global Patterns (UNODC, 2006) has also collected and presented data on incidences 
of human trafficking at the country level; therefore the utilization of this report best serves the 
purpose of our study. The UNODC Report provides cross-country information on the reported 
incidence of human trafficking in 161 countries, measuring trafficking flows on a six-point 
scale. To the best of our knowledge, this report is the only source with comparable data across 
countries and covering most countries in the world, which also differentiates between the 
intensity levels of human trafficking inflows. Our empirical analysis is based on the UNODC 
data given that we want to test the impact of prostitution laws on the degree of human 
trafficking.  
 Our dependent variable (Trafficking) captures the incidence of human trafficking into 
a country, taken from the Index on Incidence of Reporting of Destination Countries provided 
by the UNODC Report. The Index has ordinal scores ranging from 0 to 5; 0 indicates no 
reported inflow of human trafficking and 5 implies very high reported inflows (see appendix 
A for more details). The Index was constructed based on the Global Programme against 
Trafficking in Human Beings (GPAT) Database, which includes reviews on publications by 
113 institutions reporting incidences of human trafficking in 161 countries over the 1996-
2003 period. Cases reported by these institutions were collected in the GPAT Trafficking 
Database and used to determine the scores on the incidence of human trafficking in countries 
of destination, origin and transit, respectively. The 113 institutions represent major 
informational sources on human trafficking and consist of international organizations (32%), 
governmental institutions (27%), research institutes (18%), NGOs (18%) and the media (5%) 
(UNODC, 2006, p. 112). The Index has some limitations. First, it uses cross-sectional 
aggregated information from the collection period of 1996-2003 – therefore a panel analysis 
controlling for unobserved country and time effects is not possible. Second, the geographical 
distribution of the source institutions is biased towards Western Europe (29%) and North 
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America (18%),13 suggesting that the data collected might lead to an overestimation of human 
trafficking incidences in these regions relative to other regions due to reporting biases. In 
absolute terms, such reporting biases are likely to underestimate the incidence of trafficking in 
countries outside Western Europe and North America. We try to reduce the problem by 
controlling for regional effects in our estimation. The countries in each category (score) of the 
index are listed in appendix B. The main limitation of the UNODC data however is that 
reporting will arguably depend on the quality of institutions, judicial and police effectiveness, 
in particular, but also on how aware the international community is about trafficking problems 
in a particular country. However, a fair share of the information the UNODC data covers 
comes from research institutes (18%), NGOs (18%), and the media (5%), mitigating the 
problem of using official sources – the problem that other existing data such as crime statistics 
confront more severely.  
Our dependent variable thus does not reflect actual trafficking flows, and needs to be 
interpreted cautiously.14 Rather than being interested in actual absolute numbers, our analysis 
focuses on the effect of legal prostitution on trafficking flows. To the extent that – controlling 
for the substantial number of variables we employ below – the degree of distortions in 
reported trafficking intensities is not correlated with whether or not prostitution is legal, the 
low quality of data will not bias our coefficient estimates, but will only make it less likely the 
coefficients are statistically significant. While probably not sharply distinguishing between 
different degrees of the crime, the indicator is arguably positively correlated with actual cases 
of trafficking, so the index remains meaningful. To mitigate the problem that the ordered 
categories of our dependent variable may not capture true differences among destination 
countries, we also constructed a binary dependent variable which is one for medium, high, 
and very high inflows, and estimated the regression with probit rather than ordered probit. 
Our results are unchanged. Still, the results should be interpreted with caution. 
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 Our main independent variable of interest is Legalized Prostitution, which indicates 
the legal status of prostitution. Following Outshoorn’s (2004) typology on prostitution 
regimes, we construct two dummy variables indicating: 1) whether or not prostitution is 
legally allowed,15 being 1 in this case and 0 otherwise; 2) whether or not 3rd party 
involvement (such as brothel operation) is additionally legally allowed, being 1 in the case 
that brothels/pimping are legal and 0 otherwise.16 In our analysis, we focus on the effects of 
the former – legalized prostitution – while the latter is employed to test whether the additional 
legality of brothels creates an additional effect. The source data cover annual variations in 
prostitution legislation in each country from 199517 to 2003, but there is very little change 
over time in most countries and variance in the Legalized Prostitution variable is dominated 
by cross-country variation. The coding is based on information from the Country Report on 
Human Rights Practice (US Department of State, 1999-2008) and country reports on progress 
in women’s rights submitted to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW Committee).18 Appendix C shows the distribution of the legal status of 
prostitution in the world.  
 
(b) Estimation strategy 
Our regressions are based on cross-section data, with reported inflows of human trafficking 
referring to the 1996-2003 period. We include as many countries as possible given the 
availability of data for the dependent and the Legalized Prostitution variables. We therefore 
impute the missing data on the control variables. Specifically, we impute continuous control 
variables using multivariate normal regression, with 20 imputations, while the democracy 
dummy is imputed with logistic regression.19 As will be shown in table 1, our results do not 
depend on whether or not we impute these data prior to estimation. While striving to include 
all relevant country observations, we nevertheless exclude low-income countries from the 
sample, as defined by the World Bank (2010). Trafficking for the purpose of sexual 
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exploitation requires that clients in a potential destination country have sufficient purchasing 
power to pay for such services, as well as requiring domestic supply to be somewhat 
constrained. Neither of these pre-conditions is likely to hold in low-income countries: 
domestic clients are too poor to be attractive clients for potential traffickers and the 
widespread poverty among the domestic population ensures that there is no shortage of 
domestic supply. Low-income countries are therefore arguably outside the relevant sample 
population.20 
Our estimation equations take the following form: 
 
 , (1) 
 
where  represents the reported degree of human trafficking inflows in country , and 
 is our dummy variables for whether or not prostitution is legal.  is the 
vector of explanatory variables, and  is the idiosyncratic error term. Given the cross-
sectional nature of our dataset, we cannot control for unobserved country heterogeneity by 
including country fixed effects. Nor can we find a suitable and valid instrument that would be 
partially correlated with our Legalized Prostitution variable, but uncorrelated with unobserved 
country heterogeneity. To mitigate any bias this might introduce, and in order to capture at 
least some heterogeneity across groups of countries, we include regional fixed effects instead, 
denoted as .21 In all regressions, we use robust standard errors. The dependent 
variable is categorical and ordinal. We therefore use ordered probit to estimate the main 
equations; the results are robust toward using ordered logit instead.  
Our baseline estimation accounts for the most important determinants of human 
trafficking flows, according to the previous literature (Akee et al., 2010a, b; Cho, 2011, 2012; 
Jakobsson & Kotsadam, 2011). We include measures of (log) per capita income and (log) 
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population size from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2010) as control 
variables, since richer and more populous countries should experience a higher incidence of 
human trafficking inflows. In addition, we include a rule of law indicator from the World 
Bank Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, Kray & Mastruzzi, 2009), ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, 
with higher values corresponding to better outcomes. We expect a better rule of law to reduce 
trafficking flows due to traffickers facing a higher risk of prosecution.22 An index indicating 
democratic governments is taken from Cheibub, Ghandi & Vreeland (2010). The dummy is 
coded as 1 if multiple parties are legally allowed and exist outside the regime front, as well as 
if the selection of the executive and the legislature involves an either direct or indirect 
mandate from an electorate (Cheibub et al., 2010). All other things being equal, democracies 
tend to have more open borders, which lowers the risk of detection for traffickers. We include 
the share of Catholics living in a country in order to control for cultural effects.23 Cho (2012) 
has shown that countries with larger shares of Catholics have smaller human trafficking 
inflows. As religiosity reduces sexual tolerance, it arguably reduces demand for prostitution 
services and thus implies less trafficking, all else equal (Saguy, 1999). The control variables 
refer to the year 1995, so they precede the dependent variable, with the exception of the rule 
of law indicator, which is from 1998.24 Finally, we include the (logged) share of pre-existing 
migrants in a country because potential trafficking victims might be attracted by the existence 
of pre-existing migrant networks (Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2010). Data are taken from the 
UNDP Human Development Report (2010) and are only available for 1990 and 2005. We 
take the year 1990 to avoid problems with endogeneity.25 Appendix D provides more 
information on the sources and definitions of these data, while appendix E reports descriptive 
statistics. 
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4. RESULTS 
As argued in section 2, the effect of legalized prostitution on trafficking inflows is 
theoretically indeterminate due to opposing scale and substitution effects. We now analyze 
which effect dominates in our global sample of countries. Column 1 of table 1 shows the basic 
results with the sample excluding low-income countries. Data for six countries were 
incomplete and are thus imputed.26 Countries where prostitution is legal experience a larger 
reported incidence of human trafficking inflows, with the estimated coefficient statistically 
distinguishable from zero at the five percent level. Regarding the control variables, reported 
trafficking declines with better rule of law, at the ten percent level of significance. Countries 
with higher GDP per capita, larger populations, larger stocks of pre-existing migrants, and a 
democratic political regime experience a larger reported incidence of trafficking inflows, with 
all of these results being statistically significant at the five percent level. The share of 
Catholics is marginally insignificant, with a negative coefficient. The regional dummies are 
jointly significant at the five percent level. As can be seen, relative to the omitted reference 
category of Western Europe and other industrialized countries, all regional dummies, with the 
exception of East Asia, have negative coefficients. However, only the dummies for 
developing Europe and Latin America are significant at conventional levels. 
Column 2 includes a dummy that indicates whether or not third-party involvement in 
prostitution is legal. It takes the value of one if brothel operation or pimping is legal and zero 
otherwise (i.e., when prostitution is illegal or only self-employed prostitution is legal). The 
coefficient of the dummy is marginally insignificant, while the dummy for legal prostitution 
in general remains almost unchanged. This might imply that legalization of prostitution, per 
se, is more important in explaining human trafficking than the type of legalization, i.e., 
whether brothel operations or pimping are also allowed. This suggests that our assumption of 
a single prostitution market is justified. Note however that the dummy for legal third-party 
involvement is different from the legal prostitution dummy in only 10 countries. If we omit 
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the legal prostitution dummy, the dummy indicating the legality of brothels and pimping is 
significant at the ten percent level (column 3). 
In column 4 we include low-income countries, while column 5 exclusively focuses on 
high-income countries instead.27 As can be seen, the effect of legal prostitution is no longer 
significant when low-income countries are included. As we have argued in the previous 
section, low-income countries are largely irrelevant for international traffickers and the 
inclusion of these countries in the sample injects so much noise into the estimations as to 
render the identification of a significant effect of the prostitution variable more difficult. In 
the high-income country sample, the coefficient of legal prostitution is significant at the ten 
percent level, with a larger coefficient, indicating that the effect of legalized prostitution, 
compared to middle-income countries, is stronger in high-income countries.28 The significant 
coefficient in this sample is consistent with Jakobsson and Kotsadam’s (2011) results for the 
European Union. Columns 6-8 illustrate changes in the method of estimation to test for 
robustness. Column 6 uses OLS instead of ordered probit. Finally, we report results without 
imputing our data in column 7 (with ordered probit) and column 8 (with OLS). For the most 
part, the results remain unchanged.29  
The substantive effects of the statistically significant variables are also important. 
When calculating these effects for the second highest level of the dependent variable (i.e., a 
value of 4), the results in column 7 imply that an increase in the rule of law by one standard 
deviation centered around the mean reduces the baseline probability of being in this second 
highest category (which is 12.1 percent) by 1.8 percentage points. A one standard deviation 
increase in the share of Catholics among the population reduces the probability by almost 5 
percentage points, while a corresponding increase in per capita GDP increases the probability 
by 2.5 percentage points. The corresponding number for both population size and the stock of 
migrants is around 1.3 percentage points. Democracies have a 13.4 percentage points higher 
probability of receiving high reported inflows. When prostitution is legal the probability to be 
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in this second highest category is more than 12.8 percentage points higher. For comparison, 
the probability of being in the lowest category of receiving no reported inflow of human 
trafficking is 5.3 percentage points lower in countries with legal prostitution. The 
corresponding values for the other categories are -10 (at a value of 1), -8.6 (value of 2), +8.6 
(value of 3), and +1.2 (value of 5) percentage points. 
Figure 1 shows the partial leverage plot based on the linear OLS model of column 8. 
While OLS is typically not the estimator of choice for strictly positive ordered categorical 
dependent variables (not least because it produces negative predicted values), such a plot 
allows us to check whether our results for the legal status of prostitution appear to be driven 
by a few influential outliers. Figure 1 shows that this is not the case. 
– Insert Figure 1 here – 
 
5. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
We perform two important robustness tests. In table 2 we estimate regional jackknife 
analyses, in which all countries of one particular region are dropped from the analysis one at a 
time in order to test whether the results are driven by the presence of observations from a 
specific region in the sample. The results show that none of the regions substantially drives 
the coefficient of prostitution laws. The individual exclusion of each region leaves the 
coefficient significant at the ten percent level at least. 
 Next we turn to the robustness of our results to the choice of control variables. As the 
theory and empirics of human trafficking flows have only begun to be seriously addressed 
recently, there is still considerable uncertainty over which explanatory variables to include 
among its determinants. To examine the sensitivity of the results reported above, we therefore 
employ (variants of) the extreme bounds analysis (EBA), as proposed by Leamer (1983) and 
Levine and Renelt (1992), as our second test for robustness.30 EBA enables us to examine 
whether our main result that countries with legal prostitution experience a larger reported 
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inflow of human trafficking is indeed robust, independent of which additional variables are 
also included in the set of control variables.  
To conduct an EBA, we estimate equations of the following form: 
 
 ,  (2) 
 
where again measures reported human trafficking flows to country i; M is a vector 
of “commonly accepted” explanatory variables and F is a vector containing the variables of 
interest (i.e., the legal prostitution dummy). The vector Z contains up to three possible 
additional explanatory variables (as in Levine & Renelt, 1992), which, according to existing 
literature, might be causally related to the dependent variable. The error term is v.  
The EBA-test for a variable in F states that if the lower extreme bound for βF — i.e., 
the lowest value for βF minus two standard deviations — is negative, while the upper extreme 
bound for βF — i.e., the highest value for βF plus two standard deviations — is positive, the 
variable F is not robustly related to human trafficking flows. Sala-i-Martin (1997) argues that 
this criterion is far too restrictive for any variable to pass the test. If the distribution of the 
parameter of interest has both positive and negative support, then a researcher is bound to find 
at least one regression model for which the estimated coefficient changes sign if enough 
regressions are run. Consequently, not only do we report the extreme bounds, but also the 
percentage of the regressions in which the coefficient of the variable F is statistically different 
from zero at the five percent level. 
Moreover, instead of merely analyzing the extreme bounds of the estimates for the 
coefficient of a particular variable, we follow Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) recommended procedure 
and analyze the entire distribution. Accordingly, we also report the unweighted parameter 
estimate of βF and its standard error, as well as the unweighted cumulative distribution 
function, CDF(0).31 The latter represents the proportion of the cumulative distribution 
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function lying on each side of zero. CDF(0) indicates the larger of the areas under the density 
function (either above or below zero). Therefore, CDF(0) always lies between 0.5 and 1.0. 
The vector M contains the same variables as the regressions in the tables above. 
Specifically, we focus on the specification shown in column 1 of table 1, again using ordered 
probit with robust standard errors, and again imputing the explanatory variables.32 To test for 
the robustness of our results we have collected a total of 27 additional variables which could 
potentially influence the level of human trafficking flows and are potentially related to the 
effect of prostitution laws.33  
Our choice of variables derives from an extensive review of the existing literature 
(Akee et al., 2010a, b; Cameroon & Newman, 2008; Cho, 2011, 2012; Danailova-Trainor & 
Belser, 2006; Jakobsson & Kotsadam, 2011; Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2011; and Potrafke, 
2011). It covers four important aspects of potential determinants of human trafficking, namely 
international movement of people, societal vulnerability to human trafficking, crime, and 
policies combating such crime (Cho, 2012). Besides the 14 variables used for the baseline 
estimations, 27 additional variables are listed below. We use the (logged) number of incoming 
tourists to measure short-term flows of human movement across borders. We also include two 
measures of a country’s visa restrictions, indicating the number of countries whose citizens 
are allowed to enter the country without a visa.34 The share of a country’s population living in 
cities is included because urbanization may create demand for cheap services in, for example, 
household work and construction which trafficking victims can potentially provide, while 
trade (as a percentage of GDP) captures flows of goods and services which may impact on 
human movements. We include indices measuring the existence of laws for the prosecution of 
perpetrators engaged in human trafficking, the protection of victims, and the prevention of 
human trafficking (taken from Cho et al., 2011) to check whether the legal status of 
prostitution spuriously picks up the effect of policies aimed at combating human trafficking. 
The share of right-wing governments in power over the 1990-95 period is included, as right-
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wing governments can reasonably be expected to take a tougher stance on illegal migration, 
an important source of human trafficking inflows. Unemployment rates among men and 
women and employment in the agricultural sector (as a percentage of total employment) are 
also included because they have the potential to capture the demand for cheap and possibly 
exploitative labor in society outside the market for prostitution. Literacy is included because a 
higher level of education can lead to a higher level of public awareness towards human 
trafficking. Mortality rates of children under five is a proxy for the basic living conditions in a 
country, a pulling factor of international migration. The shares of Muslims and, respectively, 
Protestants in the population are included to account for potentially varying moral values, so 
the two groups might have different propensities to consume the services of trafficked persons 
(Potrafke, 2011). We include an index measuring a country’s media freedom, taken from 
Freedom House (2010). Arguably, a freer media is more likely to report on delicate issues 
such as human trafficking, making it more likely that trafficking flows will be reported. 
Dummies for English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, and German speaking countries, as well 
as dummies for British, Socialist, French, German, and Scandinavian legal origin are included 
to account for some additional group heterogeneity among countries. All variables and their 
sources are listed in appendix B. 
The results for the EBA models are presented in table 3, based on 3,303 regressions 
(with 116 observations each). Following Sala-i-Martin, we use a CDF(0) value of 0.90 as the 
threshold above which we consider variables to be robust. As can be seen, the results mirror 
those of table 1 above. With the exception of four of the regional dummies, all variables used 
for the baseline estimations pass the robustness criterion. The effect of the legal prostitution 
dummy is clearly robust to the choice of explanatory variables, as indicated by a CDF(0) of 
0.99. The dummy is significant at the five percent level (at least) in almost all of the 3,303 
regressions run. 
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6. CASE STUDIES 
Our empirical findings so far indicate that the scale effects of the expansion of prostitution 
markets after legalization dominate the substitution effects away from human trafficking. 
However, our quantitative empirical analysis is cross-sectional. As pointed out already, this 
means we cannot control for unobserved country heterogeneity. Also, while we have 
established that the legalized status of prostitution is associated with a higher incidence of 
trafficking inflows, a cross-sectional analysis cannot provide a conclusion as to whether 
legalizing prostitution would result in increased trafficking after legalization. In order to 
provide anecdotal evidence that our estimated effect of legalized prostitution is likely to 
capture a causal rather than a spurious effect, we now briefly analyze three country case 
studies, namely Sweden, Germany and Denmark. These three countries changed their 
prostitution law during the 1996-2003 period our investigation covers, albeit in opposite 
directions. Sweden prohibited prostitution in 1999, while Germany further legalized 
prostitution by allowing third-party involvement in 2002. Denmark, where prostitution as a 
main income source was previously illegal, decriminalized prostitution in 1999. Since then, 
self-employed prostitution is legal but brothel operation is still forbidden in Denmark. 
 We have sufficient data for Germany to compare the number of trafficking victims in 
the pre- and post-legalization period. For Sweden and Denmark, we lack such data. We 
therefore compare the available data for Sweden after the prohibition of prostitution with data 
for Denmark, where prostitution was legalized. Sweden and Denmark have similar levels of 
economic and institutional development, and a similar geographic position, which, as our 
quantitative analysis shows, are important determinants of human trafficking.  
Sweden amended its prostitution law in 1999 by prohibiting all forms of commercial 
sex and punishing the purchase of sex with a fine or imprisonment for a maximum of six 
months. Prior to the amendment, Sweden allowed self-employed individual prostitution while 
prohibiting brothel operation (Di Nicola et al., 2005). The amendment was introduced after 
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long debates over the root causes of prostitution in Swedish society, with the new law stating 
that prostitution by nature is always exploitative, and that the purchase of sexual services 
provided by women and girls amounts to discrimination against them (Ekberg, 2004). 
Furthermore, this new law links prostitution to human trafficking and specifically states the 
former as an alleged cause of the latter (Ekberg, 2004). Ekberg estimates – based on various 
cases reported to the Swedish Ministry of Industry, Employment, and Communications – that 
the number of prostitutes in Sweden decreased rather substantially from 2,500 in 1999 to 
1,500 in 2002, with street prostitution in particular decreasing by between 30-50% after the 
prohibition of prostitution. At the same time, Ekberg points out that even though so-called 
‘hidden prostitution’ via internet and escort services may have increased, it is generally 
agreed that the prostitution market in Sweden contracted after prohibition, as a buyer now 
risks facing criminal charges for purchasing sex (Di Nicola et al., 2005; Ekberg, 2004; 
Jakobsson & Kotsadam, 2011). Such evidence of a shrinking market indicates that the 
prohibition of prostitution in this particular case has a negative scale effect on prostitution 
markets, as theory predicts.  
However, whether or not human trafficking inflows have reduced after the prohibition 
in Sweden is a trickier question to answer because of the lack of sufficient time-series data on 
the number of victims. Di Nicola et al. (2005) provide annual estimates of human trafficking 
victims for sexual exploitation in Sweden during the 2000-03 period, suggesting anywhere 
between 200 to 600 victims per year. This would mean a share of trafficked individuals 
among the estimated 1,500 prostitutes of between 13.3% and 40%. There are, however, no 
available nationwide statistics on trafficking victims prior to the amendment in 1999 and 
therefore, a direct comparison between the pre- and post-prohibition periods is impossible. 
However, for the substitution effect to dominate the scale effect, as well as for the number of 
trafficked prostitutes to have been higher after prostitution was rendered illegal, it would need 
to be shown that the share of trafficked prostitutes was less than 8% at the minimum estimate, 
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or 24% at the maximum estimate of 2,500 prostitutes prior to 1999. A compositional shift 
from 13.3% to 8% (minimum estimate) or from 40% to 24% (maximum estimate) is of course 
possible, but would appear to require quite a large shift. 
A comparison between Sweden and Denmark, a neighboring country with similar 
socio-economic conditions yet reforming their prostitution laws in the opposite direction, 
tentatively suggests that compositional differences across regimes legalizing and prohibiting 
prostitution have been small. Since 1999, Denmark has allowed individual, self-employed 
prostitution, while prohibiting brothel operation, representing the same level of legality in 
prostitution as Sweden had before the 1999 reform. The ILO estimates the stock of human 
trafficking victims in Denmark in 2004 at approximately 2,250, while the estimated number in 
Sweden is about 500 (Global report data used in Danailova-Trainor and Belser, 2006).35 This 
implies that the number of human trafficking victims in Denmark is more than four times that 
of Sweden, although the population size of Sweden (8.9 million) is about 40% larger than that 
of Denmark (5.3 million). Importantly, the Global report also estimates the number of 
prostitutes in Denmark – about 6,000 – to be three to four times larger than the number in 
Sweden. This comparison thus tentatively suggests that the share of trafficked individuals 
among all prostitutes is fairly similar in the two countries, despite one prohibiting and the 
other permitting prostitution. This in turn, would suggest that compositional changes and thus 
the substitution effect are likely to have been small.36 
Contrary to Sweden, Germany introduced a more liberal prostitution law in 2002. 
Today, prostitution in Germany is regulated by law and regarded as a ‘regular job’ subject to 
tax payment and retirement schemes (Di Nicola et al., 2005). Prior to 2002, Germany only 
allowed individual, self-employed prostitution without third party involvement. Having a 
liberal prostitution regime, Germany is known to have one of the largest prostitution markets 
in Europe, with about 150,000 people working as prostitutes (Global report data used in 
Danailova-Trainor and Belser, 2006). This means that the number of prostitutes in Germany is 
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more than 60 times that of Sweden, while having a population (82 million inhabitants) less 
than 10 times larger. In terms of human trafficking victims, the ILO estimated the stock of 
victims in Germany in 2004 to be approximately 32,800 – about 62 times more than in 
Sweden (Danailova-Trainor & Belser, 2006). Again, the share of trafficked individuals among 
all prostitutes appears to be quite similar in both countries, corroborating the view that any 
compositional differences across prohibitionist and legalized prostitution regimes are likely to 
be small. Additionally, Di Nicola et al. (2005) provide annual estimates of trafficking victims 
used for sexual exploitation in Germany over the 1996-2003 period, which can shed some 
light on the changing number of trafficked prostitutes. The estimates show that the number of 
victims gradually declined between 1996/97, the first years of data collection, and 2001, when 
the minimum estimate was 9,870 and the maximum 19,740.37 However, this number 
increased upon fully legalizing prostitution in 2002, as well as in 2003, rising to 11,080-
22,160 and 12,350-24,700, respectively.38 This is consistent with our result from the 
quantitative analysis indicating a positive correlation between the legal status of prostitution 
and inward trafficking. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
This paper has investigated the impact of legalized prostitution on inflows of human 
trafficking. According to economic theory, there are two effects of unknown magnitude. The 
scale effect of legalizing prostitution leads to an expansion of the prostitution market and thus 
an increase in human trafficking, while the substitution effect reduces demand for trafficked 
prostitutes by favoring prostitutes who have legal residence in a country. Our quantitative 
empirical analysis for a cross-section of up to 150 countries shows that the scale effect 
dominates the substitution effect. On average, countries with legalized prostitution experience 
a larger degree of reported human trafficking inflows. We have corroborated this quantitative 
evidence with three brief case studies of Sweden, Denmark and Germany. Consistent with the 
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results from our quantitative analysis, the legalization of prostitution has led to substantial 
scale effects in these cases. Both the cross-country comparisons among Sweden, Denmark 
and Germany, with their different prostitution regimes, as well as the temporal comparison 
within Germany before and after the further legalization of prostitution, suggest that any 
compositional changes in the share of trafficked individuals among all prostitutes have been 
small and the substitution effect has therefore been dominated by the scale effect. Naturally, 
this qualitative evidence is also somewhat tentative as there is no “smoking gun” proving that 
the scale effect dominates the substitution effect and that the legalization of prostitution 
definitely increases inward trafficking flows. The problem here lies in the clandestine nature 
of both the prostitution and trafficking markets, making it difficult, perhaps impossible, to 
find hard evidence establishing this relationship. Our central finding, i.e., that countries with 
legalized prostitution experience a larger reported incidence of trafficking inflows, is 
therefore best regarded as being based on the most reliable existing data, but needs to be 
subjected to future scrutiny. More research in this area is definitely warranted, but it will 
require the collection of more reliable data to establish firmer conclusions. 
The likely negative consequences of legalized prostitution on a country’s inflows of 
human trafficking might be seen to support those who argue in favor of banning prostitution, 
thereby reducing the flows of trafficking (e.g., Outshoorn, 2005). However, such a line of 
argumentation overlooks potential benefits that the legalization of prostitution might have on 
those employed in the industry. Working conditions could be substantially improved for 
prostitutes – at least those legally employed – if prostitution is legalized. Prohibiting 
prostitution also raises tricky “freedom of choice” issues concerning both the potential 
suppliers and clients of prostitution services. A full evaluation of the costs and benefits, as 
well as of the broader merits of prohibiting prostitution, is beyond the scope of the present 
article. 
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NOTES 
                                                           
1
 See Batsukova (2007) and Ekberg (2004), then Swedish Minister of Industry, Employment, and 
Communications, as well as the New York Times regular commentator Nicholas D. Kristof 
(International Herald Tribune, 2011) for similar views. 
2
 On the other hand, the International Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (2000), does not clearly state its position concerning prostitution.  
3
 In addition, Di Nicola, Orfano, Cauduro and Conci (2005) provide descriptive statistics focusing on 
11 EU countries. According to their results, stricter prostitution laws are correlated with reduced flows 
of human trafficking. In ongoing research following this paper, Hernandez and Rudolph (2011) also 
examine the effect of legalization of prostitution laws on trafficking flows to 13 European countries. 
However, the fixed country dummies included in their analysis do not allow for the exploitation of the 
cross-sectional variation in prostitution laws. Their results reflect the few changes in the laws of the 
sample countries over the 1998-2009 period. 
4
 Note that we can remain agnostic as to whether any of those individuals actually supplying 
prostitution services do so “voluntarily.” What matters is that either prostitutes themselves, or their 
pimps forcing them to prostitute themselves, are willing to supply prostitution services. 
5
 With regard to prostitution, the apparent physical attractiveness and age of prostitutes can be crucial 
endowments determining the price level of their sexual services (Edlund & Korn, 2002). 
6
 Wages that forced prostitutes (e.g., trafficking victims) actually receive may not be high, with the 
profits earned by their pimps being high instead. 
7
 Nussbaum (1999) describes the similarities of bodily risks and working conditions colonoscopy 
artists and prostitutes face and the level of skills required for these professions. By doing so, she 
challenges the rational basis of the social stigma imposed on prostitutes (i.e., prostitutes as fallen 
women lacking bodily integrity).  
8
 We say “almost” invariably, since one could construct an argument that the illegality of prostitution 
renders the service more interesting and thus in higher demand. There might be some clients who are 
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drawn to prostitution mainly because of its illegality, but we think this phenomenon is unlikely to be 
common. For further discussions on clients’ risk aversion and decision to buy sex, see Cameron and 
Collins (2003), and Giusta et al. (2009).  
9
 The large size of the shadow economy in most countries suggests that states do not prosecute tax 
evasion vigorously (Schneider, 2005). 
10
 Consistent with this proposition, Danailova-Trainor and Belser (2006) show that human trafficking 
is higher in countries with a larger sex industry. 
11
 A domestic individual’s willingness to work as a prostitute also depends on their opportunities in 
other labor markets.  
12
 If there were severe constraints on the expansion of prostitution services provided by domestic 
individuals despite its legalization, then the share of trafficked prostitutes could even increase. This 
will typically not be the case. 
13
 The distribution of the other regions is: Asia (11%), Africa (5%), Central and Eastern Europe (5%), 
Latin America (4%), Oceania (4%) and the CIS (2%), in addition to 22% of institutions being 
categorized as international. 
14
 There is a concern that the UNODC data does not capture the number of human trafficking victims 
because the data are not weighted by the (reported) number of victims but weighted by the frequency 
the subject is mentioned in the reports. In fact counting the number of victims is one of the most 
challenging problems in human trafficking research and the literature has not yet agreed on 
appropriate estimation methods (Kangaspunta, 2003). The UNODC (2006) report explains that 
weighting by the quoted number of victims distorts the validity of information to a large extent 
because quoted figures of victims from different sources tend to contradict each other. 
15
 Prostitutes can be self-employed or employed by others (through brothels, for example). The vast 
majority of countries with legalized prostitution allow self-employed, street prostitution only, but there 
are several countries which allow both self-employment and brothel operation. In our sample, there is 
no country which legalized brothel operation while prohibiting self-employment.  
16
 Jakobsson and Kotsadam (2011) also follow this method and construct a variable for prostitution 
legislation in 2003 for 39 European countries. 
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17
 That is, one year prior to the collection of data on the incidence of human trafficking, the dependent 
variable.  
18
 In constructing the prostitution law variable, we use the CEDAW country reports for the 1995-1998 
period, and the US Human Rights Reports for the 1999-2008 period. 
19
 Coefficients and standard errors are adjusted according to Rubin’s (1987) combination rules. 
20
 Tellingly, there is only one low-income country (Cambodia) with a high incidence of inward 
trafficking and in this case the demand is driven by foreign tourists. Modeling the international sex 
tourism industry is beyond the scope of this paper. 
21
 We additionally included dummies indicating income groups. However, given that these dummies 
did not turn out to be jointly significant at conventional levels, we exclude them from the estimations. 
Our results are not affected by this. 
22
 The effect of prostitution laws on human trafficking flows might also be affected by the enforcement 
of international treaties against trafficking. When we control for government’s compliance with anti-
trafficking laws regarding the prosecution of perpetrators, protection of victims, and prevention of the 
crime (using data constructed in Cho, Dreher & Neumayer, 2011) our results are not affected. Among 
the three indices we use to measure compliance with anti-trafficking policies, only protection is 
significant at conventional levels, with the expected positive coefficient. We include these indices in 
our tests for robustness below. Another interesting question would be to investigate the effect of 
legalized prostitution on the enforcement of anti-trafficking policies. We leave this question for future 
research.  
23
 We do not include a similar variable for the share of Muslims in our main estimations since this 
variable is highly correlated with our regional dummy variable for North Africa and the Middle East. 
However, we include such a variable in our extreme bounds analysis in the robustness section. 
24
 The index is also available for one prior year, 1996. However, the number of observations is 
substantially lower so we prefer using data from 1998 instead. Note that the coding for the prostitution 
dummy refers to the year 1995. For some countries, prostitution law changed during the 1996-2003 
period: Bangladesh (2000), Colombia (2002), Germany (2002), Denmark (1999), Greece (1999), 
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Hungary (1999), Netherlands (2000), New Zealand (2003), and Sweden (1999). Our results are robust 
to the exclusion of these countries. 
25
 A set of variables of potential importance we cannot include here refers to countries’ immigration 
policies. While such policies are available for selected industrial countries, they are not available for 
the large sample of less developed countries in our sample. We address one part of immigration 
policies by including the countries’ visa restrictions in our robustness section. Our results do not 
depend on this. 
26
 These are Cuba, Hong Kong, Iraq, Libya, Qatar, and Serbia. 
27
 The World Bank (2010) defines these groups to be those with a 2009 GNI per capita below $995 
(low income) and $12,276 or more (high income). In column 4, data for ten countries are imputed: 
Afghanistan, Cuba, Hong Kong, Iraq, Democratic Republic of Korea, Libya, Myanmar, Qatar, Serbia, 
and Zimbabwe. In column 5, data for Hong Kong and Qatar are imputed. 
28
 Note that the regional dummies cannot be included in this regression given that the World Bank’s 
regional classification includes high income countries in the Western and other industrialized countries 
group. 
29
 For these models, we can also calculate goodness of fit statistics that cannot readily be provided for 
the imputed models. In the ordered probit model (column 7), McFadden's Adjusted R2 is 0.16, while 
the adjusted R-squared for the OLS model is 0.50 (column 8). 
30
 The Stata code we use follows Gassebner, Lamla and Sturm (2011).  
31
 See Sturm and de Haan (2001). 
32
 The results reported below consequently reflect the impact of the additional control variables rather 
than those of different samples. 
33
 The control variables again refer to the year 1995, with the exception of the share of right-wing 
governments and anti-trafficking policies. The share of governments refers to the 1990-1995 period, as 
we expect the type of government over a longer period to be more important than the stance of a 
government in a particular year. The policy indices are not available for 1995, so we take the average 
over the 1996-2003 period (i.e., the same years the dependent variable refers to). 
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34
 One of the measures considers a country to be visa-free if one can obtain a visa upon arrival at the 
border, whereas the other counts this as a visa restriction. 
35
 We thank Gergana Danailova-Trainor and Patrick Belser for sharing their data. The estimates of the 
ILO are in line with Di Nicola et al.’s estimate given that the duration of the victims being trafficked is 
generally between 3 to 18 months (Belser et al., 2005; Di Nicola et al., 2004).  
36
 Part of the demand in Denmark might however arise due to the change in Swedish prostitution laws 
and vice versa. As pointed out by Collins and Judge (2010), clients can be expected to react to inter-
jurisdictional differences in regulations. Swedish clients might cross the border and use prostitution 
services in Denmark, while prostitution and trafficking in Sweden might be higher if prostitution were 
illegal in Denmark as well. 
37
 On the other hand, the number of victims identified by the police varies from year to year without a 
clear pattern, probably reflecting the level of enforcement and policy priority rather than the true 
magnitude of the problem (see German Federal Police Office, 1999-2009). 
38
 This increase is partly attributable to the change in the definition of human trafficking victims in 
2003; German nationals are also included in the category from 2003 onwards. However, this change 
does not fully explain the increase because German nationals amount to only 10.3% of all victims in 
the given year (German Federal Police Office, 2005).  
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Table 1: Human Trafficking and Prostitution, cross section 
                             (1)            (2)            (3)            (4)            (5)            (6)            (7)            (8)   
Legal prostitution dummy        0.665**        0.612**                       0.322          0.948*         0.625**        0.694**        0.662***
                          (2.38)         (2.18)                        (1.45)         (1.83)         (2.61)         (2.47)         (2.74)   
Legal brothels dummy                       0.555          0.689*                                                                             
                                         (1.60)         (1.95)                                                                              
Rule of law               -0.555*        -0.547*        -0.361         -0.322         -0.827         -0.559**       -0.536*        -0.546** 
                          (1.86)         (1.83)         (1.42)         (1.41)         (1.45)         (2.13)         (1.75)         (1.99)   
(log) population           0.232**        0.241***        0.235***        0.195**        0.530**        0.177**        0.236**        0.187** 
                          (2.50)         (2.60)         (2.59)         (2.37)         (2.33)         (2.09)         (2.49)         (2.11)   
(log) GDP per capita        0.664**        0.627**        0.495**        0.444**        0.787          0.645***        0.674**        0.673***
                          (2.37)         (2.23)         (2.01)         (2.27)         (1.31)         (2.72)         (2.27)         (2.67)   
Democracy dummy            0.780**        0.750*         0.801**        0.614**        0.219          0.635*         0.813*         0.678*  
                          (2.02)         (1.94)         (2.07)         (2.28)         (0.31)         (1.91)         (1.91)         (1.83)   
(log) migrant stock        0.228**        0.221**        0.244**        0.258***        0.183          0.200**        0.222**        0.196** 
                          (2.28)         (2.21)         (2.43)         (2.91)         (0.86)         (2.23)         (2.10)         (2.07)   
Share of catholics        -0.006         -0.006         -0.005         -0.005         -0.010*        -0.005         -0.007*        -0.006   
                          (1.48)         (1.53)         (1.21)         (1.35)         (1.92)         (1.37)         (1.65)         (1.57)   
East Asia dummy            0.251          0.159         -0.059          0.173                         0.379          0.312          0.456   
                          (0.36)         (0.23)         (0.09)         (0.29)                        (0.59)         (0.42)         (0.65)   
Developing Europe dummy       -1.057*        -1.148*        -1.199**       -1.101**                      -0.909*        -1.050*        -0.890   
                          (1.77)         (1.94)         (2.06)         (2.10)                        (1.72)         (1.69)         (1.59)   
Latin America dummy       -1.658***       -1.750***       -1.561***       -1.376***                      -1.478***       -1.518***       -1.361** 
                          (3.20)         (3.35)         (3.15)         (3.08)                        (2.99)         (2.87)         (2.61)   
MENA dummy                -0.726         -0.882         -1.056**       -0.925**                      -0.587         -0.723         -0.592   
                          (1.26)         (1.53)         (1.97)         (1.97)                        (1.04)         (1.17)         (0.93)   
South Asia dummy          -0.566         -0.633         -0.866         -1.530**                      -0.280         -0.526         -0.224   
                          (0.92)         (1.02)         (1.38)         (2.37)                        (0.51)         (0.84)         (0.39)   
Sub-Sahara Africa dummy       -0.848         -0.942         -0.979         -0.905*                       -0.696         -0.734         -0.566   
                          (1.36)         (1.51)         (1.62)         (1.75)                        (1.16)         (1.07)         (0.83)   
Sample no poor no poor no poor all rich no poor no poor no poor
Method O. Probit, 
imputed
O. Probit, 
imputed
O. Probit, 
imputed
O. Probit, 
imputed
O. Probit, 
imputed
OLS 
imputed
Order Probit OLS
Number of countries          116            116            116            150   46          116            110            110   
  
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses; * (**, ***) indicates significance at 10 (5, 1) percent level. 
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Table 2: Regional Jackknife, Human Trafficking and Prostitution, Ordered Probit, imputed  
                             (1)            (2)            (3)            (4)            (5)            (6)            (7)   
Legal prostitution dummy        0.704*         0.794***        0.603*         0.565*         0.696**        0.652**        0.677** 
                          (1.84)         (2.63)         (1.91)         (1.84)         (2.47)         (2.32)         (2.34)   
Rule of law               -0.390         -0.641**       -0.552*        -0.536         -0.631*        -0.537*        -0.506   
                          (1.26)         (2.02)         (1.94)         (1.44)         (1.91)         (1.80)         (1.61)   
(log) population           0.177          0.193*         0.152          0.362***        0.284***        0.226**        0.231** 
                          (1.61)         (1.94)         (1.43)         (3.67)         (2.68)         (2.44)         (2.43)   
(log) GDP per capita        0.588*         0.749**        0.486          0.691**        0.788**        0.660**        0.595** 
                          (1.91)         (2.44)         (1.60)         (2.15)         (2.52)         (2.37)         (2.05)   
Democracy dummy            0.886*         0.730*         0.898**        0.631          0.788**        0.761**        0.753*  
                          (1.66)         (1.75)         (2.19)         (1.45)         (2.00)         (1.98)         (1.93)   
(log) migrant stock        0.188*         0.255**        0.453***        0.146          0.170          0.220**        0.204** 
                          (1.68)         (2.34)         (3.76)         (1.34)         (1.59)         (2.21)         (1.96)   
Share of catholics         0.002         -0.006         -0.007         -0.007         -0.007*        -0.006         -0.007   
                          (0.26)         (1.38)         (1.56)         (1.44)         (1.72)         (1.46)         (1.56)   
East Asia dummy            1.085*                        0.248         -0.152          0.222          0.266          0.158   
                          (1.82)                        (0.30)         (0.22)         (0.30)         (0.38)         (0.22)   
Developing Europe dummy       -0.068         -1.023*                       -1.143*        -0.993         -1.020*        -1.089*  
                          (0.10)         (1.67)                        (1.80)         (1.63)         (1.72)         (1.76)   
Latin America dummy       -1.426**       -1.680***       -1.813***                      -1.612***       -1.628***       -1.651***
                          (2.10)         (3.16)         (3.17)                        (3.03)         (3.18)         (3.06)   
MENA dummy                 0.309         -0.654         -1.068         -0.981                        -0.705         -0.793   
                          (0.76)         (1.06)         (1.50)         (1.58)                        (1.24)         (1.34)   
South Asia dummy           0.396         -0.358         -1.213*        -0.739         -0.452                        -0.626   
                          (0.47)         (0.55)         (1.75)         (1.20)         (0.72)                        (0.96)   
Sub-Sahara Africa dummy       -0.812         -1.220         -1.037         -0.744         -0.826   
                          (1.25)         (1.55)         (1.55)         (1.16)         (1.34)   
Sample without: Western 
Europe
East Asia Developing 
Europe
Latin 
America
MENA South Asia Sub-Sahara 
Africa
Number of countries           70            109             98             96            105            113            105   
  
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses; * (**, ***) indicates significance at 10 (5, 1) percent level. 
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Table 3: Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA), Ordered Probit, imputed 
Variable Avg. Beta Avg.Std.Err %Sign. CDF-U
Latin America dummy -1.63 0.55 1.00 1.00
(log) migrant stock 0.26 0.10 1.00 0.99
(log) GDP per capita 0.73 0.30 0.95 0.99
Legal prostitution dummy 0.65 0.28 1.00 0.99
Rule of law         -0.59 0.28 0.84 0.97
Developing Europe dummy -1.06 0.60 0.52 0.95
Democracy dummy     0.71 0.43 0.55 0.93
(log) population    0.18 0.10 0.62 0.92
Share of Catholics  -0.01 0.00 0.29 0.91
Sub-Sahara Africa dummy -0.76 0.67 0.01 0.86
MENA dummy          -0.66 0.59 0.00 0.86
East Asia dummy     0.44 0.73 0.00 0.72
South Asia dummy    -0.37 0.66 0.00 0.70
 
Notes: Variables are sorted according to their CDF(0). All results are based on 3,303 regressions. 
‘Avg. beta’ reports the average coefficient while ‘Avg S.E.’ indicates the average standard error of all 
regressions. ‘%Sig’ shows the percentage of regressions in which the coefficient is statistically 
different from zero at the 5 percent level at least. ‘CDF-U’ shows the (unweighted) mass of the larger 
part of the distribution of the estimated coefficients (i.e., the value is always greater or equal to 0.5). 
The criterion for a variable we consider as robust is a value of 0.9 or above. 
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Figure 1: Partial Leverage Plot of the Effect of Prostitution on Reported Human Trafficking 
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Appendix A. Degree of Human-Trafficking Inflows 
Number of Sources Index Ranking Total Number of Countries 
0a 0 (No) 24 
1 1 (Very low) 29 
2-3 2 (Low) 27 
4-10 3 (Medium) 50 
11-24 4 (High) 21 
25-40 5 (Very high) 10 
Source: UNODC (2006, p.118) 
a The Index does not explicitly specify a ranking for countries with no inflow of human 
trafficking.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   44 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Appendix B. Distribution of Countries across Categories of Human-Trafficking Inflows 
Very High High Medium Low Very Low 
Belgium 
Germany 
Greece 
Israel 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
Thailand 
Turkey 
United States of 
America 
 
Australia 
Austria 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Cambodia 
Canada 
China 
Hong Kong, China 
SAR 
Taiwan Province of 
China 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
France 
India 
Kosovo, 
(Serbia and 
Montenegro) 
Pakistan 
Poland 
Saudi Arabia 
Spain 
Switzerland 
United Arab 
Emirates 
United Kingdom 
 
Albania 
Argentina 
Bahrain 
Benin 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Cameroon 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Croatia 
Curacao 
Dominican 
Republic 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Estonia 
Finland 
Gabon 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Iran 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kuwait 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lithuania 
Macao, China SAR 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Myanmar 
New Zealand 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Panama 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Qatar 
Republic of Korea 
Russian Federation 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Sweden 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
The former 
Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
Togo 
Ukraine 
Venezuela 
Viet Nam 
Aruba 
Bangladesh 
Belize 
Brunei Darussalam 
Congo, Republic of 
Costa Rica 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
Haiti 
Indonesia 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Kyrgyzstan 
Lao People's 
Democratic 
Republic 
Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya 
Luxembourg 
Mali 
Niger 
Oman 
Paraguay 
Romania 
Slovenia 
Sri Lanka 
Uganda 
United Republic of 
Tanzania 
Uzbekistan 
Yemen 
 
Algeria 
Bhutan 
Brazil 
Burundi 
Chad 
Chile 
Congo, Democratic 
Republic of 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Honduras 
Jamaica 
Liberia 
Malawi 
Maldives 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Republic of 
Moldova 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Slovakia 
Sudan 
Tajikistan 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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Source: UNODC (2006, p.20) 
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Appendix C. Prostitution Regimes 
58.7%
35.9%
5.39%
0 1
2
0: complete prohibition;  1: prostitution legal but 3rd party involvement illegal;  2: complete legalization
(1995, 167countries)
Prostitution Regime in the World
 
Source: US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practice (1999-2008) and 
various issues of CEDAW country reports  
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Appendix D. Descriptive Statistics (estimation sample, Table 1, column 8) 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Human trafficking inflows 2.56 1.46 0.00 5.00
Legal prostitution dummy 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
Rule of law         0.19 0.99 -1.57 2.00
(log) population    16.08 1.72 12.29 20.91
(log) GDP per capita 8.90 1.05 6.92 10.83
Democracy dummy     0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00
(log) migrant stock 5.79 1.74 0.99 10.05
Share of Catholics  33.94 38.40 0.00 97.30
East Asia dummy     0.06 0.25 0.00 1.00
Developing Europe dummy 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
Latin America dummy 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
MENA dummy          0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00
South Asia dummy    0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00
Sub-Sahara Africa dummy 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
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Appendix E. Sources and Definitions 
Variables Definition Source
Human trafficking inflows Reported incidences of human trafficking inflows. Score 0 
(no flows) and 5 (very high flows).
UNODC (2006)
Legal prostitution dummy Dummy indicating whether or not a country allows 
prostitution. 1 being legal and 0 otherwise.
US Dept. of State (1999-
2008)
Legal brothel dummy Dummy indicating whether or not a country allows 
brothel/pimping. 1 being legal and 0 otherwise.
US Dept. of State (1999-
2008)
Rule of law         Index in the range of -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
corresponding to better outcomes.
Kaufmann et al. (2009)
(log) population    Log of a country's total population. World Bank (2011)
(log) GDP per capita Log of GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $). World Bank (2011)
Democracy dummy     Indicates whether multiple parties are legally allowed 
and exist outside the regime front, and whether the 
selection of the executive and the legislature involve an 
either direct or indirect mandate from an electorate. 
Cheibub et al. (2009)
(log) migrant stock Stock of migrants. UNDP (2010)
Share of Catholics  Share of Catholics in overall population. Encyclopedia 
Britannica Book (2001)
Regional dummies Dummies for the regions East Asia dummy, Developing 
Europe, Latin America, Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA), South Asia and Sub-Sahara Africa.
World Bank (2010)
Media Freedom                          Freedom of the Press Index. Score 0 (best) to 100 (worst). Freedom House (2009)
Tourism inflows Annual number of foreign visitors in a country.                     World Bank (2011)
Share of Protestants Share of Protestants in overall population. Encyclopedia 
Britannica Book (2001)
Share of Muslims Share of Muslims in overall population.                     Encyclopedia 
Britannica Book (2001)
Urbanization Share of a country's population living in cities. World Bank (2011)
Trade (% of GDP) Trade in percent of GDP.                     World Bank (2011)
Prosecution index Index assessing the level of governmental efforts to 
punish and prosecute traffickers and other related 
offenders (such as employers of trafficking victims, law 
enforcement officials who collude with traffickers, and 
clients of services provided by human trafficking victims).
Cho et al. (2011)
Protection index Index assessing the level of governmental efforts to 
protect and assist the victims of human trafficking. 
                    Cho et al. (2011)
Prevention index Index assessing the level of governmental efforts to 
prevent and combat human trafficking.
Cho et al. (2011)
Right government The share of right-wing governments in power over the 
1990-95 period.
Unemployment, male Unemployment, male (in percent of the male labor force). World Bank (2011)
Unemployment, female Unemployment, female (in percent of the male labor 
force).
World Bank (2011)
Employment, agriculture Employment in agriculture (in percent of total 
employment).
World Bank (2011)
Literacy rate Literacy rate, adult total (in percent of people ages 15 and 
above).
World Bank (2011)
Mortality rate Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000). World Bank (2011)
Visa restrictions The number of foreign countries whose nationals need a 
visa to enter the country under observation (in 2004). 
Neumayer (2006)
Visa restrictions 2 The number of foreign countries whose nationals need a 
visa to enter the country under observation (in 2004), 
counting visa provision at border as visa-free access. 
Neumayer (2006)
Language dummies Dummies for English speaking, French speaking, Spanish 
speaking, Portuguese speaking, and German speaking 
countries.
CIA (2010)
Legal origin dummies Dummies for British, Socialist, French, German, and 
Scandinavian legal origin.
La Porta et al. (1998)
 
